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INTRODUCTION: LABOUR, LAW, AND SOCIETY
MICHAEL D. BAYLES*

Labour law directly affects most people's daily lives, yet, except
for Marxists and Marxians, scholars of jurisprudence and the
philosophy of law have largely ignored it. This neglect might be due
partly to labour law's variability from country to country and partly
to its detailed and esoteric nature. However, labour law involves major
issues of society and life. One can define labour law narrowly as the
law pertaining to employer-employee relations, or one can define it
broadly as all extant and possible law concerning work in society.
The essays in this collection take a jurisprudential or philosophical
approach to North American labour law in the broad sense. Obviously,
in this small collection many important topics are not addressed. This
introduction tries to place the papers in a general framework that
includes some of the important topics not addressed.
I.

RIGHTS AND WORK

To evaluate extant labour law, one needs a conception of the
role of work and labour in society and a framework for evaluating
it. This basically means that one needs a theory of society and labour
as well as a political-legal philosophy-a very tall order indeed. The
first three articles in this collection discuss some of the issues involved
in developing such a basis for evaluation.
Work is a major factor in the lives of most normal adults. One
can distinguish between work and employment, for many people who
work, such as housewives, are not employed. 'Labour' can be used
to refer to either work or employment. Although in their papers
Richard De George and Adina Schwartz expound at some length on
the importance of work and its social organization, it is useful to note
briefly three aspects of the importance of-work to most people's lives.
First, work is economically important in most people's lives. Employment, whether by others or oneself, is the primary source of income
* Professor of Philosophy, University of Florida; and Fellow, National
Humanities Center (1984-85).
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for the vast majority of people. However, the work of people who
are not employed is also economically important in their lives. The
work of housewives or househusbands (undoubtedly together the
largest group of persons who work but are not employed) is
economically important to the family. Indeed, some women do not seek
employment outside the home, because the costs of replacing their
services in the home exceeds their potential earnings. In nonmechanized agriculture and some small family businesses, the work
of children is also a significant economic benefit to the family.
Second, work is important simply due to the amount and kind
of activity it involves. Any activity that occupies 35 or more hours
a week must loom important in people's lives. The nature of any
activity occupying so much of a person's waking life must also be
important. Work can be physically difficult or easy, mentally difficult
or easy, stressful or relaxing, boring or interesting, and so on. It can
develop one's capacities and require using one's abilities to the fullest,
or it can allow them to atrophy. Most work does both, developing
some abilities and causing or allowing others to atrophy. Although
people prefer different types of work, most people probably prefer
work that requires them to use many of their abilities.1
Third, the type of work one does is important because of its
effects on one's relations with others. At a simple level, most people
develop friendships with some of their co-workers. Even the interpersonal relationships of people who work alone, such as housewives, are
strongly influenced by their work; for example, neighboring
housewives often form informal groups that meet for coffee. In a more
complex way, people often identify themselves with their work. When
strangers meet on airplanes or trains, one of the early questions asked
of each other is what work they do. People identify themselves as
politicians, car salespersons, business persons, teachers, engineers, and
so forth, and such identification affects the way others interact with
them. For example, to tell a stranger on a train that one is a
philosopher is often to invite a puzzled look .and an abrupt halt to
conversation.
Although the nature and organization of work has never been
stagnant, during this century they have been subject to change at
an ever increasing rate. During the early part of the century, factory
work changed to assembly-line work. Farm labourers have all but disappeared from the land, at first replaced by independent farmers with
mechanized equipment, and now by large agribusinesses. Small
1.

See J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 426-28 (1971).
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businesses took second place to large corporations and are now regaining importance, but often as franchises in large chains. The percentage of professionals in the labour force has increased greatly, and
now even many of the previously independent practitioners -lawyers
and doctors-are employees of large firms. Railroaders have given
way to truckers. In mid-century industrial society, blue collar workers
were the largest segment of workers. In the present North American
post-industrial service economy, white collar workers form the largest
segment. Yet, society and labour law may not have adequately altered
to reflect these changes.
The remaining years of this century are likely to bring even
greater changes, changes that raise significant issues for society and
labour law. Perhaps the major source of changes is technological
development bringing about an electronic information society.
Developments in electronics are quickly changing the nature of work.
It is certainly conceivable that by the end of the century, mail and
books as we currently know them will disappear. Letters and lettercarriers will be relics of the past, replaced by immediate electronic
communication between home computers over telephone lines. Books
may also be stored in large central computer banks with people able
to call them up by computers and print out a copy if they want one.
(This introduction is being written on a computer, largely eliminating
the need for a secretary and decreasing the amount of paper used.)
In factories, electronic robots are beginning to displace workers.
These technological changes will significantly affect the nature
of much work. The hope has been that the changes will eliminate the
drudgery of work so that people will have jobs making greater use
of their abilities. Yet, a recent study reported in the news suggests
that the effect may be the reverse. In the computer industry, about
25 percent of the jobs are interesting, upper middle income ones, while
75 percent are uninteresting, low paying jobs, such as assembling
computers. A large scale change of this sort would tend to eliminate
the large middle class and split society into two groups of upper middle
and low income. Such changes could have major effects on society.
Another major effect of these technological developments may
be the elimination of many jobs. Although the effect of the new
technology on employment is a matter of considerable dispute, the
intermediate range outlook for employment in Canada is not bright.
Some forecasts in the fall of 1983 predict average unemployment of
10 percent for the next five years. In some ways Canada is special
because of its previously high proportion of workers in resource
extraction, yet, at the same time data from Great Britain, whose labour
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force is not heavily engaged in resource extraction, show unemployment at 13 percent. If work, usually employment, plays such an
important role in the lives of most people, these unemployment rates
will have a major effect on the lives of many people.
One response to the foregoing scenarios would be to recognize
a right to work. Both Richard De George and David Beatty in their
papers argue for such a right, but they provide quite different
arguments for it. De George bases his argument on human rights,
starting with the right to work recognized in the United Nations
Declaration of Human Rights.2 This right can be interpreted by, and
derived from, other human rights. De George argues that the human
rights to life, personal development, and respect support the human
right to work interpreted as a positive right, that is, as one imposing
an obligation on society to provide work, not merely prohibiting
interference with people working if they can find employment. De
George also notes changing social conditions that make the right to
work more important to recognize now than in the nineteenth century. He discusses how North American (especially United States)
ideology of free enterprise and collective bargaining have operated
to prevent the recognition of a right to work. A right to work has
not developed from collective bargaining, because it has not been in
the interest of unions and union leaders to press for it.
De George does not discuss in detail how a right to work might
be implemented. One method often discussed, one which De George
does not strongly favor, is for the government to be the employer
of last resort. An alternative or at least supplement is to provide
workers tenure. Even if it might not be feasible to require companies
to continue the employment of workers during a deep recession, it
might be feasible to require them to retain or retrain workers who
become obsolete or would otherwise be jettisoned into the sea of
technological change.
Against this suggestion it might be argued that placing the
burden of technological change on enterprises rather than society as
a whole through government programs might be unfair. The total
social costs and benefits of technological change are the same, whether
the government or enterprises pay for the costs. Moreover, it is often
not possible to predict what changes will affect an industry. For example, if biotechnologists develop a new strain of corn with nitrogen
fixing properties, much of the chemical fertilizer industry would
become irrelevant in a very few years. As this scientific breakthrough
2.

G.A. Res. 217 A (III), U.N. Doc. A123 (1948).
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cannot be predicted and the costs of retaining employees would force
many of the companies into bankruptcy, this solution would be unfair.
Yet, one might argue that enterprises should pay their true social
costs; that worker displacement is a cost of the introduction of new
technologies; so enterprises should have to absorb the costs of worker
displacement. Doing so would lead to better judgments about the value"
of introducing new technologies. Although this argument might be
appropriate for some technological changes, such as word processors,
the above example of a nitrogen fixing strain of corn illustrates a
difficulty with it. The technological change in one industry (farming)
might have major impacts on enterprises in other industries (chemical
fertilizer). In short, it is not technological change by the chemical fertilizer plants that would produce the worker displacement, so those
enterprises should not have to absorb the costs. The costs should be
spread among all those who benefit from the change, and eventually
that is everyone in society.
David Beatty's argument for a right to work at a decent wage
is only part of a broader set of principles for labour relations. He
argues from what he takes to be central elements of liberal theory
of law for a regime of industrial democracy. The central principle of
the liberal theory of law, according to Beatty, is the moral equality
of persons. More specifically, each person has a right to equal respect
for liberty. In the realm of civil and political rights, this principle
implies certain substantive rights, such as freedom of speech, and certain procedural rights, such as one person, one vote. In the area of
labour relations, the theory implies substantive rights, in particular,
the right to work at a decent wage. It also has procedural implications, in particular, that workers have an equal right to participate
in decisions that importantly affect them in their work. Collective
bargaining, as practiced in North America, Beatty claims, does not
secure the procedural rights in a liberal theory of labour relations
and should be greatly modified to a system of industrial democracy.
This would involve broader definitions of worker groups and a collegial
rather than adversarial model of labour relations wherein workers
participate with management in industrial decisions rather than
bargain with management over a comparatively narrow range of
issues.
In her paper, Adina Schwartz criticizes a common methodological
approach which she claims De George and Beatty use. This approach
rests on two principles. The principle of metaethical individualism is
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that one first determines the justifiable rights and claims of individuals
and then evaluates social institutions by their ability to recognize and
satisfy those rights and claims. The principle of the priority of pure
normative theory is that normative principles are universalindependent of time and social conditions. A pure normative theory
is developed and then applied to particular social conditions.
Because the social organization of work relates to how people
produce and reproduce social life, Schwartz claims, this approach will
not work, and an alternative is needed. What is produced, the work
process by which it is produced, and the distributional structure in
society are all interrelated and affect other aspects of social life such
as the family and friendships. Metaethical individualism requires that
the claims of individuals be identified and justified without assuming
work structures. But the main types of theory, Schwartz claims,
presuppose certain social structures. Thus, their argument is circular.
Instead, Schwartz contends, we should ask what types of work structures make sense for us in our historical and social context. We can
then consider what changes in work and other social structures would
be required, use a consistent set of values to evaluate the costs and
benefits of changing society, and then decide whether the changes
are worthwhile. Within limits, reasonable people might disagree about
the appropriate changes, but at least there is a basis for reasonable
argument.
Schwartz's methodological critique extends far beyond the area
of labour relations and applies to the evaluations of all parts of law
and other social institutions. However, it is important to examine
evaluative theories closely to make sure that in practice, as opposed
to theory, the methodological assumptions she criticizes are indeed
made. For example, while Schwartz suggests that De George makes
these assumptions, it is not completely clear that he does. He
recognizes that a right to work will emerge only in certain types of
social conditions. Similarly, although Beatty appears to make the
assumptions, the liberal theory of law is one that has developed in
Western societies during the last century or two. It certainly is not
one that characterized ancient Athens. One might view it as a very
general statement of what kinds of institutions "make sense to us."
II.

RIGHTS AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING

In North America, there are in effect two different coexisting
regimes of labour law-the common law of contract governing people
employed by individual contracts and the law governing collective
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bargaining by unions. Superimposed on both are certain statutory conditions concerning such matters as minimum wages, employment of
children, unemployment insurance, and social security. Most of the
focus of labour law, at least as taught, is on collective bargaining.
However, most employees in the United States and Canada are not
covered by collective bargaining agreements.
One can approach collective bargaining by considering problems
frequently encountered in individual contracts. First, usually these contracts are not written, so many of the terms are not clearly spelled
out. Second, employers can terminate the employment without giving
reasons. (In Canada, reasonable notice must be given, and the
reasonableness of the notice is based on the length of time the
employee has been employed by that employer.) Third, the conditions
of employment are determined by bargaining between the individual
and the employer. Given a large supply of labour, an individual has
relatively little bargaining power. Wages are usually set by market
forces. With current and expected rates of unemployment (at least
in Canada), individuals do not have much bargaining power and the
market tends to keep wages low. In short, except for people with
special skills in short supply, individuals have little ability to determine the conditions under which they work, because compared to
employers they have little bargaining power.
Around the time of World War Two, collective bargaining laws
were established in North America. Recognizing the unequal bargaining power of most employers vis-a-vis most employees, the aim of the
laws was to permit workers to organize and bargain as a group with
employers. Organized employees have more bargaining power than
individuals and so the two parties then approach bargaining equality.
The underlying normative principle is that the agreements of two
equal parties are fair. Consequently, the laws were primarily designed
to establish fair procedures for two such parties to work out an
agreement.
The law of collective bargaining generally aims to ensure that
the bargaining process is fair. It determines the size of the employee
bargaining units, certifies bargaining agents, requires bargaining in
good faith, broadly specifies the scope of issues to be determined by
a contract, regulates the methods of exerting pressure on the other
party (strikes, lockouts, etc.), and sets up procedures for handling

3.

See, e.g., Employment Standards Act, ONT. REv. STAT. ch. 147, S 13 (1970).
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impasses in the bargaining. Many of these tasks are assigned to a

labour board.
Although much of the detail of labour law is the same in the
United States and Canada, there is a difference in the legal attitude
toward collective bargaining. The U.S. position is one of neutrality
towards collective bargaining, while Canadian law supports it." This
raises the question of the value of collective bargaining. Three
plausible reasons can be offered to support the value of collective
bargaining: its effects on renumeration; its effects on working conditions, particularly respect for, or fair treatment of, employees in the
workplace; and the intrinsic value of participating in union and bargaining activities.5
None of these reasons presents an overwhelming argument for
the value of collective bargaining. The economic benefits of collective
bargaining are not so clear.6 Some gain may be realized, but the
acceptance of reduced compensation by many union employees of financially troubled businesses during the 1981-82 recession and the
widespread layoffs of unionized employees indicate that unionization
and collective bargaining are not absolute protections against wage
rollbacks and unemployment. Second, it is not clear how much of the
noticeable improvement in workplace fairness during the last quarter
century has stemmed from collective bargaining and how much has
stemmed from human rights legislation and other protections.
Unionization does not appear to have done much to protect female
employees from sexual harassment, especially from male employees
in the same bargaining unit. Third, the value of participation can easily
be exaggerated. For example, it is hard to take the following claims
literally.
...[C]ollective bargaining is the most significant occasion
upon which most of these workers ever participate in making social decisions about matters that are salient to their
daily lives.... [Cjollective bargaining is intrinsically valuable
as an experience in self-government. It is the mode in which
employees participate in setting the terms and conditions
of employment rather than simply accepting what their
employer chooses to give them. . . .

4. See P. WEILER, RECONCILABLE DIFFERENCES: NEW DIRECTIONS IN CANADIAN
LABOUR LAW 25 (1980).

5. Id at 24-33.
6. Id. at 28-29.
7. Id. at 32, 33.
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The participation of the average rank and file union member is hardly
the momentous occasion these claims suggest. Consequently, skepticism about the value of collective bargaining is reasonable.
In view of the structure of collective bargaining law, five sets
of issues arise. (1) Who should engage in collective bargaining? This
issue involves questions of the definition and size of bargaining units
and whether certain types of employees should be denied collective
bargaining. (2) What matters or topics should be subject to collective
bargaining? Besides wages and hours, many other matters might be
the subject of negotiation, such as job tasks, safety conditions, and
even the products and services of a company. (3) How should an agreement be interpreted and implemented? Should the usual standards
of contract interpretation apply, or are there special principles for
collective agreements? Usually, disputes are resolved by arbitrators
with possible appeals to courts, but other methods are certainly
possible. (4) What should be done or permitted if an agreement cannot be reached? This includes questions of strikes, lockouts, secondary boycotts, picketing, mediation, and arbitration. (5) What legal
procedures and mechanisms should be used to oversee all of these
matters? This includes courts, labour boards, and various other techniques. This set overlaps with (3) above, but it is broader in scope
in covering the issues in (1), (2), and (4) as well.
The last two papers in this collection address some of these
issues. In her paper, Susan Sherwin in effect considers an aspect of
what should be the subject of collective bargaining. Her question is
when should a substantive matter be imposed by the state rather than
left to collective bargaining. She notes several reasons for the state
to be reluctant to impose substantive conditions on agreements, such
as the need to vary conditions for different workplace arrangements
and the difficulty of obtaining compliance with conditions to which
the parties did not agree. Taking affirmative action programs for
women as an example of a substantive matter that might be imposed
by the state, she sketches the arguments for affirmative action. She
then argues that affirmative action programs are not likely to result
from collective agreements, because, for a variety of reasons, it is
rarely in the interest of either party to press hard for them. For
example, when women constitute a minority of the bargaining unit,
the majority is likely to be willing to sacrifice affirmative action for
benefits for the majority, such as higher wages. Drawing on her
analysis, Sherwin concludes that besides labour codes setting minimal
standards for all employment, the state should substantively intervene
only on behalf of minority groups subject to systematic discrimination.
In the course of her analysis, Sherwin remarks on the vulnerability of public employees in bargaining with the government. One
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1984
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may be puzzled to find Sherwin viewing public employees as particularly vulnerable in negotiations, while others claim that they have
power not possessed by employee groups in the private sector. In
part, this difference of opinion may be due to the different levels of
government they consider. Sherwin primarily considers public
employees at the provincial level where the government can legislate
wages and override the bargaining process (as several Canadian provincial governments did in 1982 in the name of reducing inflation).
Local governments lack such powers.
The paper by Morley Gorsky focuses on a particular question
in the interpretation of collective agreements, namely, management
rights clauses. These are general clauses purporting to retain rights
for management to take actions not covered by other parts of the
agreement. They come into question when matters such as the assignment of overtime are challenged as arbitrary or discriminatory.
Although Gorsky emphasizes the interpretation of a recent decision
of the Ontario Court of Appeal, the discussion has a much broader
significance, going to the very root of the concept of collective bargaining. The broad issue concerns the impact of collective bargaining
legislation on the relation between the parties. As noted above, the
intent of the legislation was to make the parties to the employment
contract more nearly equal. The fundamental question concerns
interpreting the change in status brought about by the legislation.
On the extreme management rights view, it leaves the common law
intact except for altering the power of the parties; thus, management
retains all the rights it had at common law, namely, to run the business
as it sees fit, unless rights are explicitly bargained away. On an
extreme union rights view, collective bargaining legislation changes
all that and the parties became moral equals, so management is subject to all the requirements of fair dealing unless the union explicitly
bargains away such rights. Gorsky argues that both the U.S. Supreme
Court and the Ontario Court of Appeal have opted for a moderate
position between these two possible extremes. Some minimal elements
of fairness must be followed by management even if the agreement
does not explicitly so provide. The discussion shows how broad
philosophical views of labour relations are important in questions of
interpretation and implementation of the details of agreements.
Underlying Gorsky's discussion is the usual method of enforcement of collective agreements in North America. The agreement provides for arbitration of grievances. Sometimes a single arbitrator is
agreed to by both parties. Sometimes panels of three arbitrators are
used, one from management, one from the union, and one supposedly
neutral. However, arbitrators are restricted to interpreting a contract,
and matters of law can be appealed in the courts. In the case Gorsky
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol19/iss1/1
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discusses, the arbitrator was held to have acted beyond her authority.
Sometimes employees do not wait for arbitration but engage in
wildcat strikes, which are illegal while an agreement is in force. Courts
often issue back to work orders. An interesting side aspect of this
has recently developed in Canada. A citizen of Montreal who held
a monthly bus pass filed a class action suit against the bus drivers'
union for the lost value of the pass due to an illegal strike. The
Supreme Court of Canada refused the union's motion to have the
employers named as co-defendants.8 The possibility of such suits may
drastically increase the costs to some employees of wildcat strikes.
None of the papers in this collection focuses on what happens
when the parties fail to agree. In the first instance, at least in the
private sector, the parties are left to their own resources. This means
that they try to exert pressure on one another, perhaps by employees
sticking strictly to the work rules and slowing production, but more
usually by strikes or lockouts. Usually neither party is anxious to have
work cease through a strike or lockout, because employees lose wages
and employers lose income from reduced sales. However, in some circumstances, at least from the employer's point of view, a strike is
not that damaging, for example, when there is a large stockpile of
goods and falling demand for them. In other situations, when there
is a strong demand for the product, a strike can be very costly to
employers. In any event, the result of a strike or lockout is usually
increased incentive on both parties to come to an agreement. Governments will often make mediators available to help the parties reach
an agreement.
In the public sector, strikes are usually illegal and courts will
issue back-to-work orders. However, if public employees are denied
the right to strike, then their main bargaining weapon has been
removed and their power decreased. This seems to undermine the
foundation of collective bargaining-increasing employee bargaining
power so that the parties are equal. Yet, governments are also unlikely
to resort to a lockout, so in effect both are weakened. Despite legal
prohibitions, public employees do go on strike, and rarely can or do
governments take the action of President Reagan during the 1981 air
controllers' strike and simply fire all striking employees.
A variety of techniques can and have been used to resolve public
sector disputes when the parties cannot agree. The dominant method
is interest arbitration; an arbitrator simply settles the terms of the
8. Riders Free to Sue Union in Montreal, THE GLOBE AND MAIL, Sept. 29,1983,
at 11.
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contract. However, because such arbitrators are likely to split the
difference, this method does not provide the parties a strong incentive to moderate their positions in hopes of reaching a negotiated
settlement. If an agreement is not reached and the arbitrator splits
the difference, an extreme position will prove more beneficial than
a moderate one. To avoid this problem and encourage settlement by
negotiation, sometimes 'final-offer' arbitration is used. Here, each side
makes a final proposal, and the arbitrator is limited to choosing one
or the other. As one might lose, there is a stronger incentive to settle. A defect of this approach is that both offers might have elements
totally unacceptable to the other party, elements that would never
have survived a negotiated settlement, and the arbitrator must choose
one or the other. Finally, limited strikes by public employees might
be permitted. The strikes can be limited as to who may strike. For
example, striking nurses might be required to keep some beds open,
such as intensive care beds, and to assist in nonelective surgery. Alternatively, strikes can be limited in duration. For example, Ontario physicians have used rotating limited strikes. Physicians in different
localities would cease work for one day a week, with the possibility
of escalating to ceasing work for two days, three days, and so on and
in more localities.
III. ADJUDICATION, ADMINISTRATION, AND
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING

The final question raised above was what type of procedure
should be used to oversee collective bargaining. As has been indicated,
a mixture of adjudicative and administrative methods are used. Labour
boards are administrative agencies, but some of them, such as the
National Labor Relations Board in the United States, operate much
like courts. Courts are also involved in various aspects, such as
handling appeals on matters of law from arbitrators' decisions and
issuing back to work orders for illegal strikes. Alternatively, the
British Columbia Labour Relations Board has broad jurisdiction over
the whole range of issues and normally works in an administrative
fashion.9
Collective agreements are a form of what have been called relational contracts."0 These contracts are not one time transactions
between strangers, such as buying a bottle of pop at a refreshment

9. WEILER, supra note 4.
10. See I. MACNEIL, THE NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT: AN INQUIRY INTO MODERN CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS (1980).
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stand while visiting a park. Rather, they regulate ongoing relations
between the parties. Both workers and management expect to continue their relationship, though in somewhat modified form, beyond
the expiration of the current agreement. Indeed, industrial relations
are often compared with family relations, another primary example
of a continuing relationship. Yet this analogy may not bode well for
an adjudicatory approach to collective bargaining and industrial relations, for the law and courts have been notoriously inept in familial
relations. Indeed, the general trend has been to take courts out of
family disputes as much as possible by allowing no-fault divorces,
domestic agreements, and using family counselors. One might view
these changes as applying elements of the more successful labour law
to family relations by setting a framework and allowing the parties
to reach their own agreements.
More radical approaches to labour law involve abolishing collective bargaining as it has been practiced in North America. One alternative is to turn to government regulations, which might involve a
regulated economy. The other alternative is some form of industrial
democracy, as advocated by Beatty. To complete the divergence of
views in this collection, Sherwin generally supports continued collective bargaining with minor modifications in both the private and public
sectors.
Thus, the papers in this collection represent a wide spectrum
of views on a number of topics in labour law broadly construed. They
also illustrate the relevance of jurisprudential and philosophical views
to general and specific issues in labour law. A number of directions
for reform are suggested. Both De George and Beatty call for recognition of a right to work, and Beatty also recommends a major restructuring of labour law towards industrial democracy. These are general
suggestions for reform requiring many details to be worked out. More
specific reforms -government required affirmative action programs
in Canada-are suggested by Sherwin. During the next decade, labour
issues are likely to loom large on the social scene as unemployment
remains high and technological change alters the nature of work.
Analyses such as those in this collection, whether or not one agrees
with them (and the authors do not agree with one another), are needed
to contribute to resolving the challenges that lie ahead.
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